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ABSTRACT
Online Social Media (OSM) is extensively used by contem-
porary Internet users to communicate, socialize and dissem-
inate information. This has led to the creation of a distinct
online social identity which in turn has created the need of
online social reputation management techniques. A signif-
icant percentage of OSM users utilize various methods to
drive and manage their reputation on OSM. This has given
rise to underground markets which buy/sell fraudulent ac-
counts, ‘likes’, ‘comments’ (Facebook, Instagram) and ‘fol-
lowers’ (Twitter) to artificially boost their social reputation.
In this study, we present an anatomy of purchased follow-
ers on Twitter and their behaviour. We illustrate in detail
the profile characteristics, content sharing and behavioural
patterns of purchased follower accounts.
Previous studies have analyzed the purchased follower mar-
kets and customers. Ours is the first study which analyzes
the anatomy of purchased followers accounts. Some of the
key insights of our study show that purchased followers have
a very high unfollow entropy rate and low social engagement
with their friends. In addition, we noticed that purchased
follower accounts have significant difference in their interac-
tion and content sharing patterns in comparison to random
Twitter users. We also found that underground markets do
not follow their service policies and guarantees they pro-
vide to customer. Our study highlights the key identifiers
for suspicious follow behaviour. We then built a supervised
learning mechanism to predict suspicious follower behaviour
with 88.2% accuracy. We believe that understanding the
anatomy and characteristics of purchased followers can help
detect suspicious follower behaviour and fraudulent accounts
to a larger extent.
Keywords
underground market, fake follower, online social media, user
behaviour
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Research Aim and Motivation
Online Social Media(OSM) like Twitter, Facebook, YouTube
and Instagram are being used by Internet users to interact
and spread information by enabling them to maintain their
online identity. This online identity is based on content shar-
ing and interaction patterns. To boost the reputation and
popularity of their online social profiles, users utilize various
methods like sharing interesting content, attracting more
‘likes’ and ‘followers’. This has led to the creation of an un-
derground fraudulent market which promises to boost the
reputation of online social profiles by selling ‘likes’, ‘com-
ments’ and ‘followers’. Recent studies indicate that, selling
fake Twitter followers now generates a revenue around $360
million per year.1 The cost of buying 1,000 Twitter followers
can be as low as $2 which has further enabled these under-
ground markets to perpetrate spam on Twitter. Most of the
underground markets claim to provide high quality and gen-
uine ‘comments’, ‘followers’ and ‘likes’. One of the popular
services which sells Twitter followers claims - “you will get
followers which are of high quality. Means, you won’t see any
profiles with egg images or a profile with no tweet at all”.2
This drives a large number of users to use such services who
want to increase their social media popularity. Recent arti-
cles reveal that even popular and celebrity users on Twitter
have admitted to buy followers to look more popular.3
Overall, Twitter follower markets provide two popular pur-
chasing schemes – (i) Without Followback and (ii) With Fol-
lowback. The primary difference between the two schemes
is the requirement of Twitter password by the merchant
(i.e., the follower selling websites). In the first scheme, the
customer only has to pay for the desired number of follow-
ers. When users opt for the second scheme, the merchant
asks for the Twitter credentials (password) of the customer
users. This enables the merchants to compromise and make
the customer user part of fraudulent follower network [19].
These compromised accounts can be then used to spread
spam and other malicious content. Previous studies reveal
that underground follower market contributes to about 10-
20% spam on Twitter [22]. Figure 1 shows an illustration
of the two purchasing schemes discussed above on one of
the popular Twitter follower markets (buyfollowers.co).
One of the reasons why these markets have gathered a large
customer base is because they claim to provide quality guar-
antees. Many markets guarantee active and genuine Twitter
users as followers. Some markets also guarantee retention of
the purchased followers for at least a year. Since the Twitter
follower markets generate high revenue by fraudulent meth-
ods and the followers provided by them successfully circum-
vent spam filters; it is important to study the anatomy of
1http://cir.ca/news/fake-twitter-followers
2http://www.buyfollowers.co/twitter.html
3http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/23/fashion/
twitter-followers-for-sale.html
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these Twitter profiles and find key identifiers of suspicious
following behaviour.
Figure 1: Different purchasing schemes provided by
one of the Twitter Follower markets: buyfollow-
ers.co
1.2 Research Contribution
This study has the following research contributions:
• We present an anatomy of the purchased Twitter fol-
lowers. We characterize the profile attributes and the
behavioural features of the purchased followers. We
also compare their charecteristics with legitimate users.
• We identify key indicators to distinguish between sus-
picious following behaviour from that of genuine Twit-
ter users. We use these identifiers and built a super-
vised learning mechanism which identifies suspicious
following behaviour with an accuracy of 85%.
Previous studies have detected and analyzed merchants and
customers of the underground Twitter follower market [19].
Stringhini et al. also detected market victims, i.e., the com-
promised users that become part of the follow network. Our
study however, focusses on the analysis of purchased follow-
ers. These followers accounts may not have been compro-
mised by the merchants. Researchers have also explored the
at-registration patterns of the purchased followers [22], that
is, the properties of the registered account like email, IP ad-
dress, number of attempts at CAPTCHA solving etc while
registering for the Twitter account with suspicious follow-
ing behaviour. They studied properties of the accounts put
for sale at the time of Twitter account registration and use
these features for early detection of fraudulent account regis-
trations. Despite such available techniques, there still exists
an underground follower market. In this study, we aim to
understand the dynamics of existing Twitter accounts which
are sold as ‘followers’ by the underground market. Our
study concentrates on understanding the profile characteris-
tics, behavioural and content sharing patterns of purchased
Twitter followers. We further use these patterns to auto-
matically detect suspicious following behaviour and present
the most discriminative features to do the same.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows – Section 2
explains the related work followed by a short introduction
to Twitter follower markets in Section 3. We explore the
anatomy of purchased Twitter followers in Section 4 and
use the discriminative features to detect suspicious follow
behaviour in Section 5. We finally conclude and illustrate
some of the possible future work in Section 7.
2. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present some closely related work focussed
on detection of spam and malicious behaviour on Twitter.
We also summarize the previous literature on the under-
ground market which enables spam monetization on online
social media.
Over last few years, researchers have conducted several stud-
ies on online social media and specifically, Twitter. With an
increase in use of social media, miscreants have started to
spread spam and malicious content on social media [17]. Re-
searchers have proposed several techniques to detect spam
and malicious content on Twitter. Some of these strategies
involve analysis and detection of sybil nodes [4, 24]. Previous
studies have also used Twitter based charecteristics to iden-
tify features which can be helpful to detect spam users [1,
12, 18]. URL based methods have used blacklist lookup
and URL redirection chains to detect spread of malicious
content [13, 20]. Researchers have also shown that spam-
mers use compromised accounts to spread spam on Twit-
ter [6]. Various methods like finding common content shar-
ing patterns, modelling user behavior and detecting bot-like
tweeting activity have been used to detect compromised ac-
counts [5, 7, 21].
Recent studies have shown that miscreants use several strate-
gies to monetize spam and other malicious activities [14].
There exists a huge underground market which sells spe-
cialized services and products like fraudulent accounts [21,
22], CAPTCHA-solving [15], pay-per-install [2] and writing
fake reviews or website content [16, 23]. Such underground
markets are a threat to quality of service and is generating
a revenue of about $360 million per year from sale of fake
Twitter followers.4
Twitter follower market is one of the most popular under-
ground markets. Users attempt to gain followers in order to
boost their popularity [3]. Researchers have modelled suspi-
cious following behaviour by identifying difference in follow
pattern from the majority [10]. Researchers have previously
studied how underground markets operate and understand
the dynamics of merchants and customers. They studied the
unfollow dynamics of the victim accounts whose credentials
are compromised by the merchants [19]. However, our study
focusses on the analysis and characterization of purchased
Twitter followers. Previous studies have characterized the
registration time properties of purchased accounts like the
email address used, originating IP address and time taken for
creation of accounts. Researchers investigated the economy
of follower markets and estimated the revenue they gener-
ate by selling fraudulent accounts and services. Researchers
used these at-registration-time properties of the accounts
sold by the merchants to identify features which can be used
to detect fraudulent accounts as and when they are created
by the merchant [22]. Despite such techniques, there exists a
large underground market which promotes the sale of Twit-
ter followers. In order to better understand the dynamics
4http://cir.ca/news/fake-twitter-followers
of purchased followers and deter such practices, we present
an anatomy of purchased follower accounts. Our study ex-
plores the profile characteristics, content sharing patterns
and behavioural features of purchased follower accounts.
3. TWITTER FOLLOWER MARKET
3.1 Purchase Schemes
In this section we briefly explain how Twitter follower mar-
ket operates. The underground market of Twitter follow-
ers constitutes more than two-dozen services which generate
an annual revenue of $360 million by the sale of followers.
These markets sell followers in bulk and have various pur-
chase schemes. Figure 1 illustrates two popular purchasing
schemes of the follower markets. The cost of bulk follow-
ers may differ from one market to another, however, most
markets offer the following two purchasing schemes -
Without Followback. In this scheme, the customer has to
provide the Twitter handle (@username) for which he wants
to purchase followers and select the number of bulk accounts.
The user himself does not need to follow back other users
to gain followers. This purchasing scheme is convenient to
use, since the user does not need to provide his Twitter cre-
dentials to the merchant. This enables the customer to pur-
chase bulk followers for any Twitter handle. This has been
exploited by hoaxers in past where they spammed a popular
news website’s Twitter account with 75,000 fake followers. 5
In this study we purchase Twitter followers via this scheme
to create our ground truth dataset. We use multiple Twit-
ter accounts to gain followers from different services. We
describe our dataset in more detail in Section 4.1.
With Followback. In this scheme, the customer has to pro-
vide the Twitter credentials (password) of the account for
which he wants to gain bulk followers. This allows the mer-
chant to include customer in the fake follower network by
making his account follow other accounts and customers. In
this scheme, the customer’s account is at the risk of being
compromised since merchant gets the Twitter account pass-
word. Previous studies have shown that such compromised
accounts are used to spread malicious URLs and tweets pro-
moting the merchants [19]. To purchase bulk followers in
both the schemes, customers have the option to pay via Pay-
Pal, WebMoney or credit cards. After making the purchase,
followers are provided to the desired Twitter handle within
a couple of hours to few days depending on the choice of
purchase scheme and the amount of followers.
3.2 Service Policies and Guarantees
The merchants of underground Twitter follower market pro-
vide various guarantees to customer at the time of purchase.
Many merchants claim to provide authentic followers –“Cus-
tomers who purchase Twitter followers with us are assured
to get real followers on time”. 6 Some merchants also pro-
vide retention guarantee where they claim that there will
not be any drop in the purchased number of followers – “...if
5http://www.dailydot.com/technology/socialvevo-
swenzy-fake-twitter-followers-spam-attack/
6http://buytwitterfollower.org/authentic-services/
you loose any number of followers within a period of 1 year
from the date of purchase, we’ll refill the page with the lag-
ging followers, at absolutely free of cost”. 7 Many merchants
also provide money-back guarantee in case of partial fulfil-
ment of services – “If you receive 1 follower less than you
ordered we will issue a full refund.”. 8 Such promising guar-
antees encourage customers to place bulk orders in order to
boost their social reputation. In Section 4.2 we illustrate
that merchants do not necessarily stick to the guarantees
they provide to customers and the purchased followers may
not be of high quality or real.
3.3 Freemium Market
Apart from the above two purchase policies to gain follow-
ers, there also exists a freemium model in Twitter follower
underground market. In this model, users have to authorise
a third-party Twitter application and in return gets about
60-100 followers. The permissions asked by the application
include - See who you follow, and follow new people, Update
your profile and Post Tweets for you. Thus, once authorised,
the application is able to post promotional tweets about the
merchant using the customer user’s profile and the user be-
comes part of the follow-network. This study however fo-
cusses only on the premium model where users have to pay
to gain followers.
4. ANATOMY OF PURCHASED TWITTER
FOLLOWERS
In this section, we provide an analysis of the characteris-
tics of purchased follower accounts. We describe in detail
the profile properties, content sharing and behavioural pat-
terns of purchased followers and highlight their suspicious
behaviour.
4.1 Dataset Description
For our analysis, we purchased Twitter followers from two
merchants. We created two dummy accounts to make pur-
chases from these merchants. To ensure that regular Twitter
users do not start following us, we (i) maintained a minimal
Twitter profile without a ‘profile image’ or a ‘bio’; (ii) made
the purchase within few minutes after creation of the ac-
count. Therefore, we safely assume that all the followers
which we gained were from merchants with whom we placed
the purchase order. Table 1 describes the cost and number
of followers we purchased from each merchant.
Table 1: Dataset description of purchased followers
from underground market
Merchant
Users
Purchased
Users
Obtained
Date of
Purchase
Cost/1000
followers
buyfollowers 1,000 1,090 10-02-13 $9.99
buy1000followers 10,000 11,346 04-18-14 $1
There exist several Twitter follower markets, however we
chose the two mentioned in Table 1 because they provided
followers at a very cheap rate and offered fast delivery. No-
tice that the cost of buying followers from buy1000followers.co
7http://www.buyfollowers.co/twitter.html
8http://www.followersfortwitter.com/
was one-tenth the price of the first one. We opted for“without-
followback” purchase scheme on both the merchant sites and
obtained 12,436 unique followers accounts. Out of these
users, 11,760 users have public profiles on Twitter. Some of
our analysis in latter sections based on content sharing pat-
terns focusses only on these 11,760 unique users. For all the
12,436 users, we took hourly snapshots of their profile based
information which we use in our analysis. Table 2 gives the
description of hourly snapshots and number of public pro-
files from each merchant.
Table 2: Hourly snapshots and public users
Merchant
#Hourly
Snapshots
Unique
Users
Public
Users
Tweets
buyfollowers 1,400 1,090 902 83,936
buy1000followers 600 11,346 10,768 339,432
For each follower captured in our hourly snapshot, we ex-
tract past 200 tweets by that user. Table 2 shows the number
of tweets we collected for users from each market. We col-
lect 350,778 tweets to analyse the content sharing pattern
by purchased followers.
4.2 Analysis of Market Service Policy
Follower markets provide guarantees and service policies to
the customers as described in Section 3. In this section we
describe how markets do not stick to the guarantees they
claim.
4.2.1 Fluctuations and Drop in Followers
The markets we used to purchase Twitter followers provide
‘retention guarantee’ stating - We have 1 Year retention
guarantee policy which means if you loose any number of
followers...we’ll refill the page with the lagging followers, at
absolutely free of cost
Figure 2(b) shows hourly fluctuations in number of follow-
ers since the date of purchase. The figure has various dips
where the number of followers reduced drastically. We pur-
chased 1,000 followers from the Market1 (buyfollowers.co),
however, after few days the total number of followers were
reduced to less than 800 as shown in Figure 2(a). We con-
tacted the merchant, but did not get a response. Even after
the drop in followers to 800, there were frequent dips with
constantly decreasing count of the number of followers. The
second market (buy1000followers) exhibits the same pattern
in Figure 2(b). Note that there were several dips in the num-
ber of followers in both markets, however, we did not gain
new users as followers. Users from the same set of initially
obtained users kept unfollowing and following us back. This
also highlights the suspicious behaviour of the purchased
followers.
To analyse whether the dips in follower count are at a spe-
cific time, we measured correlation of follower count with
hour of the day. We calculated the Pearson Correlation Co-
efficient (PCC) between the follower count distribution and
the corresponding hour of the day of snapshot time. We
found that there does not exist any correlation between the
follower count and time for both the merchants (PCC =
0.01, 0.009, indicating negligible correlation).
(a) Market1 - buyfollowers
(b) Market2 - buy1000followers
Figure 2: Purchased follower fluctuations in differ-
ent Twitter follower underground markets
We further analysed the dips in purchased follower count.
We noticed that several followers keep unfollowing and fol-
lowing us back. We took hourly snapshots of the purchased
followers and found that in the first market, 928 out of 1,090
users unfollowed us one or more times. In the second mar-
ket, 10,595 out of 11,346 users unfollowed and followed us
back. Figure 3 shows the unfollow frequency by purchased
followers from each market. In the first market, about 85%
users unfollowed us at least 24 times and about 1% users un-
followed us more than 1,300 times within a span of 7 months
consisting of 1,400 hourly snapshots. In the second market,
during a span of 400 hourly snapshots, the maximum un-
follow rate for a single user was 388. We believe that high
unfollow entropy can be useful to detect suspicious following
behaviour; we explore this phenomena more in later sections.
Also, a large number of dips and spikes in the follower count
of a user can put the user under suspicion of having fake
followers.
Figure 3: Unfollow Rate of Purchased Followers
4.2.2 Inactive and Suspended Accounts
The follower markets claim that the purchased followers will
be of high quality and will have active users. Stating the ser-
vice policy of the market from where we purchased followers
– “you won’t see any profiles with egg images or a profile
with no tweet at all. They all have complete bio and recent
tweets on their timeline.”
We investigate the quality of purchased followers to find out
whether the accounts were active or not. Figure 4(a) indi-
cates that only 26% purchased followers had a tweet within
past 200 days at the time of our analysis during April 2014.
About 45% users had not tweeted even once in past 2 years.
This clearly indicates violation of service policy by the mar-
kets and also shows that the purchased followers are of low
quality.
We further analyze the past 200 tweets of all the purchased
follower accounts. We found that a large fraction of users
post less original content and only retweet. Figure 4(b)
shows that 38% users had less than 50% original tweets
posted on their timeline. Also, 10% purchased users had
more than 99% of their tweets as only retweets. This shows
that the purchased followers do not actively post content
themselves but rely on retweeting activity to increase their
status count.
(a) CDF of time (in days) of the last tweet posted by
purchased follower accounts
(b) CDF of fraction of Retweets over Tweets posted
by the purchased follower accounts
Figure 4: Tweet Inactivity of Purchased Followers
Out of the 1,090 followers we obtained from the first mar-
ket, 55 user profiles were suspended. According to ‘Twitter
rules’, accounts are suspended in case of violation of rules. 9
This shows that not all the followers delivered by the mer-
chant were quality profiles.
We further investigated the profile properties of purchased
9https://support.twitter.com/articles/15790-my-
account-is-suspended
followers according to the service policy provided by the mer-
chant. We found only 4 users which had the default ‘egg’
profile picture. However, out of the 1,090 purchased follow-
ers, 700 profiles did not have a profile description.
4.2.3 Social Reputation
The follower markets claim that the purchased accounts will
be real and of high quality – “Authenticity of followers is
guaranteed”. To validate the quality of purchased followers
we used ‘Klout’ 10 to determine the social influence. ‘Klout’
is a popular tool to measure influence based on various fac-
tors like followers, freinds, retweets and favourites. The aver-
age Klout score for the social media users is 40. 11 However,
as shown in Figure 5, we found that 90% of the purchased
followers had a Klout score of less than 20. This shows that
these accounts do not involve in discussions with other users
and have a low influence score.
Figure 5: CDF of Klout Score of Purchased Follow-
ers
The above characterization shows that the merchants do not
stick to their service policies and guarantees. We also find
that the purchased followers are low quality and have a sus-
picious following behaviour. We use these indicators to build
a system which can detect suspicious following behaviour.
4.3 Network Characteristics of Purchased Fol-
lowers
In this section we analyze the network properties of the pur-
chased followers. We look at various factors like the follower
and friends count, unfollow entropy, and follower/friends ra-
tio.
4.3.1 Follower / Friends Ratio
We look at the relationship between amount of followers and
friends for purchased follower accounts. On Twitter, ‘follow-
ers’ of a person are the users which subscribe to the posts of
that person, i.e., who ‘follow’ him. The ‘friends’ of a person
are the users whom he subscribes to. The average number of
followers per existing account is 68 and the average number
of friends is 60 on Twitter.
Figure 6 shows a large fraction of purchased follower ac-
counts have low follower count but a very high friends count.
10http://www.klout.com
11http://support.klout.com/customer/portal/
articles/679109-what-is-the-average-klout-score
It also shows that the difference in the number of followers
and friends is large and the purchased follower accounts do
not gain a lot of followers themselves. To investigate this
further, we look at the Follower-Friends ratio of these ac-
counts.
Figure 6: Number of Followers vs Friends of pur-
chased follower accounts
We observe in Figure 7 that the follower/friends ratio fits
the power law (α = 1.8209, error σ = 0.029). We observe
that 94% purchased followers have the follower/friends ratio
as only 0.1 and none of the purchased followers had more
followers than friends. This further strengthens our obser-
vation that purchased accounts have a low follower count.
Figure 7: Follower-Followee ratio of purchased fol-
lower accounts
4.3.2 Unfollow Entropy
We found that the purchased follower unfollowed a large
number of users regularly. To quantify this behaviour, we
calculated the unfollow entropy of all the purchased follow-
ers. We observed each purchased follower over a span of 30
days and collected his hourly followers. We define normal-
ized unfollower entropy H for a user un as the following
Hun = −
ΣTi=1pn(fi)log(pn(fi))
N
where, pn(fi) is the probability that the user un will unfollow
at time ti. The probability function is defined as
pn(fi) =
ucounti
ΣTi=1ucounti
where T is the number of days for which we monitor the
purchased follower and ucounti is the number of users he
unfollowed on ith day. A higher value of unfollow entropy
signifies that the user exhibits a suspicious unfollow pattern.
Figure 8 shows that a large fraction of purchased followers
have a high unfollow entropy. The normalized entropy rate
for 23% purchased followers is as high as 0.76 and only 8%
users have a normalized unfollow entropy less than 0.21. To
find out whether the users with higher unfollow entropy have
lower quality than other users, we compared their normal-
ized unfollow entropy rate with Klout score. We found a
strong negative correlation (Pearson correlation coefficient
= -0.73 ) indicating that users with higher unfollow entropy
rate have low social reputation.
Figure 8: Unfollow Entropy Rate for Purchased Fol-
lowers
4.4 Social Engagement with Friends
In this section, we explore how the purchased follower ac-
counts are connected with their friends. We measure social
engagement of users with their friends in form of retweets,
@-mentions and favorite count. We also find out language
overlap patterns between the users and his friends.
4.4.1 RTs and @-mentions
We observed in section 4.2.2 that a large fraction of pur-
chased accounts post only retweets instead of original con-
tent. We further explore whether these users retweet the
content of their friends or not. If RTcounti is the number of
tweets the user has retweeted of his friend ui and he has N
friends, then we define
RetweetRatio =
RTcounti
ΣNi=1RTcounti
N ∗RTtotal
where RTtotal is the total number of retweets done by the
user. This Retweet Ratio quantifies the number of friends
a user has retweeted and the number of times he retweeted
them.
Similarly we define the @-mention ratio to determine whether
the user engages in conversations with his friends and to
Figure 9: Social engagement of Purchased Users
with their Friends
what extent.
@mentionRatio =
@counti
ΣNi=1@counti
N ∗@total
where @total is the total number of @-mentions by the user.
We observe in Figure 9 that the highest Retweet Ratio score
is 0.45 and the @-mention ratio is 0.35. This shows that
though a large fraction of purchased accounts post only
retweets, its not the tweets of their friends which they are
retweeting. Similarly, low @-mention ratio suggests that
purchased followers do not mention their friends. We found
the maximum @-mention ratio with the followers of pur-
chased users to be 0.32. This further strengthens our obser-
vation that purchased followers are low quality users and do
not engage in conversations with their friends or followers.
4.4.2 Language overlap with Friends and Followers
We charecterize the language used by the purchased follow-
ers and the overlap with their friends. Figure 10(a) shows
the distribution of language of purchased accounts. We ob-
serve that a 52% of the users tweet in spanish. We also found
that the purchased followers tweet and retweet in multiple
languages as shown in Figure 10(b). Thirteen percent users
used 5 or more languages. Only 32% users posted tweets in
less than or equal to two languages. We next find out the
overlap of language amongst the purchased accounts with
their followers and friends.
(a) Distribution (b) Number of Languages
Figure 10: Languages used by Purchased Followers
Users tweet and retweet in multiple languages. Therefore,
we calculate the Language Overlap Score for each user de-
fined as
LangOverlap =
ΣNi=0overlapi
N
where N is the total number of friends or followers. If Lf is
the set of languages used by the friend/followers and Lu
is the set of languages used by the purchased user then
overlapi with each friend/follower ui is defined as
overlapi =
{
1, if |Lf ∩ Lu| 6= 0.
0, otherwise.
We use the Language Overlap score to determine how many
users tweet in same language as their friends or followers.
Figure 11 shows that 80% users had an Overlap Score =
0.37 with their followers and Overlap Score = 0.68 with their
friends. This indicates that a large fraction of purchased
follower accounts do not care about the content posted by
the users they are following. Also, the followers of these
users do not have a high language overlap with them.
Figure 11: Language Overlap of Purchased Followers
with their Friends and Followers
4.5 Spam Perpetrated by Purchased Follower
Accounts
In this section, we analyse the URLs posted by the pur-
chased users. For each user, we collected his past 200 tweets
and extracted the URLs if any. We observed that a large
fraction of followers we purchased post tweets with URLs.
Table 3 summarizes the number of tweets with URLs from
each market we purchased followers.
Table 3: Tweets with URLs
Merchant
Public
User
Tweets
Tweets
with URLs
buyfollowers 902 83,936 45,945
buy1000followers 10,768 339,432 188,836
To determine whether the URLs posted by the purchased fol-
lowers are legitimate or not, we used multiple lookup services
which maintain a blacklist of phishing, malware and other
malicious URLs. We used PhishTank, Google Safebrowsing
API, SURBL and VirusTotal API to lookup the URLs. We
found that 12% of the users we purchased posted one or
Table 4: Spam URLs detected by blacklists
Merchant Spam URLs PhishTank
Safebrowsing
API
SURBL VirusTotal
buyfollowers 2,504 200 1,856 1,710 1,021
buy1000followers 23,321 2,021 14,432 10,311 13,341
more tweet with a URL blacklisted by one of the above ser-
vices. We summarize the blacklist lookup results in Table 4.
We observed that 13.67% tweets of purchased accounts were
spam. Out of 234,781 tweets with URLs, we found that
32,117 tweets had a spam URL. The unique number of spam
URLs were found to be 25,825.
To understand the kind of spam users were perpetrating, we
analyse content of the spam tweets which were in english.
Figure 12 shows the most popular words which appear in
tweets with spam URLs. We observed that a large frac-
tion of spam was about the fake follower underground mar-
ket. #follow, followers, followback keywords suggest that
the purchased users were trying to spread propaganda about
the follower market. The other kind of spam we observed
was directed towards stealing credentials, i.e., phishing at-
tack. Some of the keywords related to spam spread by the
purchased followers were ipad, money, lottery.
Figure 12: Word Cloud of Spam Tweets by Pur-
chased Followers
5. PREDICTION OF SUSPICIOUS FOLLOW-
ING BEHAVIOUR
In the second part of our study, we build a supervised pre-
dictive model to detect suspicious following behaviour on
Twitter. In this section we explain the feature set used for
the classification task and the experimental setup.
5.1 Features for Classification
For our prediction task to detect suspicious following be-
haviour we explore user profile, network, content and user
behaviour based features. In all, we explore 18 features for
our classification task as described in Table 5. User pro-
file based features focus upon properties of the Twitter user
profile information. The network based features describe
the relationship of the user with his friends and followers.
We next explore the content based features to understand
the nature of tweets posted by the user and also investigate
the behavioural features to understand the tweeting patterns
and follow dynamics exhibited by the user. For the network
based features, we constrain our analysis to single hop net-
work of the users due to Twitter API rate limit restrictions.
Also, we keep our content based analysis limited to stylistic
features of tweets due to the presence of multi-lingual users
in our dataset and the complexity of computation due to
transliterated text, misspellings and use of short hand lan-
guage. Table 5 enlists all the feature sets we used for our
prediction task.
Table 5: Description of the feature sets
Set Category Number Features
A User Profile 4
presence of bio
presence of URL in bio
number of posts
social reputation
B Network 2
follower / friends ratio
number of followers
C Content 6
hashtags per tweets
spam words used per tweet
length of tweet
number of languages used
number of RTs per tweet
@mentions per tweet
D Behaviour 6
unfollow entropy rate
RT engagement score
@mention engagement score
language overlap
time since last tweet
tweets per day
We explained some of these features in the previous section;
here we describe how we calculated the values of remaining
features:
Presence of bio and URL:. Some Twitter users give de-
scription about themselves on their profile which is called
bio. We check the presence of bio for each user under in-
spection. We also check whether the user has mentioned
any external URL in his bio and use this as a feature.
Social reputation:. We define social reputation by the Klout
score which gives an estimate of the impact score of the user
on various online social media.
Hashtags per tweet:. We calculate the average number of
hashtags used per tweet. We define this metric as
hashtag/tweet =
ΣNtweet=0#hashtags
#tweets
Spam words used per tweet:. In the earlier section, we
noticed that a fraction of purchased follower accounts also
spread spam and malicious content. To detect spam in the
tweet content, we use a spam word lookup list 12 and define
12http://www.mailup.com/spam-words-to-avoid.htm
the following metric
spam words/tweet =
ΣNtweet=0#spam words
#tweets
Time since last tweet:. We found that purchased follow-
ers exhibiting suspicious following behaviour have very less
tweeting activity and a large fraction of such users are inac-
tive. To measure time since the account has been inactive,
we find the difference in time in seconds since the latest
tweet with the time of our experiment.
These are the discriminative features we use to distinguish
between regular and suspicious following behaviour. With
the help of these features, we detect users with suspicious
follow behaviour in the following section.
5.2 Experimental Setup and Classification
For our classification experiment, we consider the 11,760
public purchased followers as our true positive dataset of
suspicious follow behaviour. For the negative class (legiti-
mate follow behaviour), we pick random 11,760 users from
Twitter stream using the streaming API. However, a bal-
anced dataset as ours may create a sample bias. Therefore,
to ensure valid results and eliminate the bias, we under-
sample our negative class. We draw 10 random but inde-
pendent subsets from the set of 11,760 legitimate users (-ve
class) and train 10 classifier models based on these 10 sub-
sets along with the 11,760 samples of the suspicious follow
behaviour users (+ve class). We then use 10 fold cross vali-
dation and report the average results for our prediction task.
We treat the detection of suspicious follow behaviour as a
two class classification problem. In order to detect such be-
haviour, we use several supervised learning algorithms like
Naive Bayes, Gradient Decent, Random Forest etc. How-
ever, we achieved highest accuracy and overall best results
with Support Vector Machine (SVM). The goal of a SVM is
to find the hyperplane that optimally separates the training
data into two portions of an N-dimensional space where N
is the total number of features used. A SVM performs clas-
sification by mapping input vectors into an N-dimensional
space, and checking in which side of the defined hyperplane
the point lies. We use a non-linear SVM with the Radial Ba-
sis Function (RBF) kernel for our experiment. Table 6 gives
the details of our experimental setup - dataset description
and the parameter values for the SVM classification algo-
rithm.
Table 6: Description of the experimental setup
Dataset 23,520
‘Suspicious’ (+ve class) 11,760
‘Legitimate’ (-ve class) 11,760 (10 times)
Classifier SVM
C 1,000
alpha 20.0
Classification Runs 10
Feature Sets {A}, {A, B}, {A, B, C}, {A, B, C, D}
Train-Test Split 70%-30%
Cross Validation 10-fold
To reduce the error margin, we use a large C value for the
RBF kernel of SVM. In order to assess the effectiveness of
features, we repeat the classification experiment by incre-
mentally adding each feature set. For evaluation, we used
70-30 split of the training and the testing dataset. We use
10 fold cross validation to report our results.
5.3 Classification Results and Evaluation
Table 7 shows the confusion matrix for our classification
task. The confusion matrix defines the percentage of false
negatives and false positives. We were able to accurately
classify 82.5% users with suspicious follow behaviour and
88.3% users with legitimate behaviour. This shows that we
are able to detect suspicious following behaviour to a good
extent. However, for the evaluation of our classification re-
sult, we used the standard evaluation metrics in this clas-
sification task – accuracy, F-measure and Area under the
Curve (AUC).
Table 7: Confusion Matrix – Classification Results
Predicted
Suspicious Legitimate
True
Suspicious 82.5 17.5
Legitimate 11.7 88.3
As discussed in the previous section, we incrementally added
feature sets to evaluate the effectiveness of all the features.
Figure 13 shows the performance of our classifier on Accu-
racy, F1 score and AUC metrics when feature sets are incre-
mentally added. We see that each feature set has a positive
effect on the performance of the classifier across all metrics.
We also observed that adding behavioural based features
suddenly increase the overall accuracy of our classification
model. We received a maximum accuracy of 88.2%.
Figure 13: Classification accuracy to predict sus-
picious following behaviour on incremental feature
addition
5.4 Feature Importance
In this section, we look at the importance of features used
for suspicious follow behaviour detection. We found that be-
havioural features play an important role in detecting suspi-
cious behaviour. Unfollow entropy rate plays an important
role; it is defined as the frequency with which the user is un-
following his friends over time. Some of the most informative
features we received after our classification task were unfol-
low entropy, RT-engagement ratio, @mention-engagement
ratio, Language Overlap and Social Reputation. The other
informative and discriminative features were the use of mul-
tiple hashtags and spam words in the tweets. The user pro-
file based features were the least helpful in detection of sus-
picious follow behaviour. One possible reason for this could
be that a large fraction of legitimate users do not add a bio
or engage in heavy conversations on Twitter.
6. ETHICS
We ensured that all money we paid to underground mer-
chants to acquire fake followers was exclusively for Twitter
accounts created and fully controlled by us and for the sole
purpose of conducting experiments in this paper. We ad-
hered to Twitter guidelines and did not contact any Twit-
ter user or acquire his/her account credentials. We ensured
that no Twitter user was harmed or benefitted as a result
of this research experiment. This experiment was purely
for research; we do not encourage users to purchase Twitter
followers.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this study we explored the dynamics of purchased fol-
lower accounts. We found some characteristic features of
users which exhibit suspicious follow behaviour. We inves-
tigated the behavioural features of the followers purchased
from underground Twitter follower market and found that
a large fraction of users feep following and unfollowing their
friends at regular basis - an activity which is unusual for a
legitimate account holder. We thus define the term unfollow
entropy to measure the rate of unfollow over time. In order
to understand the dynamics of purchased follower accounts,
we divided our study into two parts. In the first part, we
studied the properties of users with suspicious follow activ-
ity and how they are different from regular Twitter users. In
the next part, based on the discriminative features, we used
supervised learning methodology to detect suspicious follow
behaviour from regular behaviour. We received an overall
accuracy of 88.2%.
In this study we only looked at one of the Twitter follower
market schemes where there is no need to follow back the
merchant or provide the Twitter password. The dynam-
ics and network structure of such a market which requires
password might be different from the one we focussed on in
this study. In future we plan to compare the various mar-
kets and automatically detect merchants and customers to
reduce this fraudulent activity on Twitter.
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